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Control, Collaboration or Coverage: The NLRA and 
the St. Paul Chamber Orchestra Dilemma 
Rochelle Gnagey Skolnick* 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 27, 2003, the musicians of the Saint Paul Chamber 
Orchestra (SPCO) voted by a margin of nineteen to fifteen to ratify a 
renewal of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA or the 
“Agreement”) between Local 30–73, American Federation of 
Musicians (AFM) and the St. Paul Chamber Orchestra Society (the 
“Society”).1 This Agreement was novel both for the negotiation 
methods by which it was produced, involving facilitators and interest-
based bargaining,2 as well as for its substance. The final document 
stood as the culmination of a Strategic Planning Process begun over 
three years earlier, but more importantly as the blueprint for the 
 * J.D. (2006), Washington University School of Law; B.M., Eastman School of Music. 
The author is a former professional orchestra musician. She would like to thank the numerous 
orchestra committee members and delegates from the International Conference of Symphony 
and Opera Musicians (ICSOM) who generously shared their experiences and concerns, but 
particularly the musicians of the St. Paul Chamber Orchestra, whose cooperation was essential. 
 1. Master Agreement Between The Saint Paul Chamber Orchestra and the Twin Cities 
Musicians Union Local 30–73 for Seasons 2003–04 Through 2006–07 (Dec. 8, 2003) 
[hereinafter SPCO Agreement] (on file with author). 
 2. See Paul Boulian, A Bold Experiment: The Process, 16 HARMONY 55, 56–57 (2003), 
available at http://www.soi.org/harmony/archive/16/Bold_Experiment_Boulian.pdf; Bruce 
Coppock, A Bold Experiment, 16 HARMONY 1 (2003), available at http://www.soi.org/ 
harmony/archive/16/Bold_Exp_Coppock.pdf. The SPCO Contract Renewal Group consisted of 
five musicians elected by their peers, three members of the Board of Directors’ Executive 
Committee, and three members of the senior administrative staff. Boulian, supra, at 56. Paul 
Boulian, a board member of the Symphony Orchestra Institute (SOI), and Fred Zenone, a 
former ICSOM chair and then-SOI President, agreed to facilitate the process. Id. at 56–57.  
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experimental future of one of America’s most highly-regarded 
professional orchestras.3 
In the months after the Agreement was ratified, it inspired a flurry 
of heated debate within the orchestral world over the wisdom and the 
legality of some its more controversial provisions.4 Chief among the 
criticisms is the level of musician responsibility. The Agreement 
provides for joint management-musician committees, which will 
determine the artistic leadership of the institution and administer the 
entire scope of orchestra personnel decisions, from hiring new 
musicians to dismissing those whose performance no longer meets 
the standards of the group.5 These joint committees raise two 
interrelated questions of labor law interpretation.6 First, does the 
musicians’ assumption of new duties place them outside of the 
coverage of the National Labor Relations Act’s (the NLRA or the 
“Act”)7 statutory protections for employees? Second, are these 
committees NLRA-prohibited employer-dominated labor 
organizations, or does the committees’ exercise of supervisory 
functions transform them into functional arms of management? 
While the musicians and management of the SPCO responded to a 
unique set of circumstances,8 the orchestra’s quest for excellence and 
the financial challenges that emerged during the CBA renewal 
process are common to symphony orchestras across the United 
States.9 Orchestra musicians and managements, which have always 
 3. SAINT PAUL CHAMBER ORCHESTRA, SAINT PAUL CHAMBER ORCHESTRA STRATEGIC 
PLAN 4 (2003), available at http://www.soi.org/harmony/archive/16/spcoStrategicPlan.pdf 
[hereinafter SPCO STRATEGIC PLAN]. 
 4. See, e.g., Laura Ross, The 2004 ICSOM Conference, SENZA SORDINO, Oct. 2004, at 1, 
available at http://www.icsom.org/pdf/senza424.pdf. Ross, ICSOM Secretary, reports that “[a] 
major [2004 ICSOM] conference topic was governance, including the increased roles some 
musicians are assuming in their orchestras.” Id. 
 5. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 4–6. 
 6. The contract raises a host of subsidiary issues that are beyond the scope of this note, 
but well worth considering. Perhaps most interesting is the enforceability of the provision, 
discussed infra note 62 and accompanying text, that creates an explicit waiver of management’s 
right to claim that any musician is not an employee covered by the NLRA. SPCO Agreement, 
supra note 1, at 65. 
 7. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–59 (2005). 
 8. Coppock, supra note 2, at 3. 
 9. See, e.g., Donald Rosenberg, Orchestra's Hanson is Setting the Tempo, CLEVELAND 
PLAIN DEALER, May 9, 2004, at J1 (“‘Almost without exception, every orchestra is facing 
financial challenges.’” (quoting Cleveland Orchestra Executive Director Gary Hanson)); see 
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brought unique issues to the traditional industrial labor-management 
paradigm,10 have begun to redefine the division between labor and 
management. This change arose from the search for renewed 
relevance and cultural vitality in a world increasingly fraught with 
challenges to an orchestra’s maintenance of the status quo. 
Management has begun to recognize that an orchestra’s musicians 
represent a tremendously valuable, but largely untapped, resource in 
this effort.11 
As orchestra boards of directors, managers, music directors and 
musicians reapportion institutional responsibility, everyone involved 
must be cognizant of the risks attendant to such an undertaking. For 
musicians, foremost among these risks is the danger that they may 
lose the very tool they have successfully employed over the past 
several decades to improve their wages and working conditions: the 
right to bargain collectively under the protection of the NLRA.12 
also Michael J. McMennamin, Editorial, Donation Wouldn’t Have Solved Orchestra’s 
Problems, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 29, 2004, at 13A. (“Most of the nation's successful 
orchestras are suffering from the same financial challenges, including Detroit, Baltimore, 
Chicago, Cleveland, Boston and Cincinnati.”). McMennamin is the Chairman of the Columbus 
Symphony Orchestra’s Board of Trustees. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Everette J. Freeman, Research Issues in Orchestra Labor Relations, 2 
HARMONY 27 (1996), available at http://www.soi.org/harmony/archive/2/Research_Issues_ 
Freeman.pdf (proposing additional research on a number of issues unique to the field of 
orchestra labor relations). Henry Fogel, former President of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra 
Association and current President of the American Symphony Orchestra League (ASOL) notes 
that “[m]any thoughtful people dislike the term ‘labor-management’ when applied to symphony 
orchestras and their musicians.” Henry Fogel, Are Three Legs Appropriate? Or Even 
Sufficient?, 10 HARMONY 11, 18 (2000), available at http://www.soi.org/harmony/archive/10/ 
Three_Legs_Fogel.pdf. Fogel finds this position justified because it tends to “put musicians in 
the category of laborers rather than professionals.” Id. He advocates “musician-employer” as an 
alternate usage. Id. Although Fogel’s commentary is likely driven by concern about unhelpful 
stereotypes, it disregards the fact that the NLRA explicitly embraces professionals. See 29 
U.S.C. § 152(12) (2005), quoted infra note 67. Fogel’s phrase substitution is emblematic of a 
larger cultural move away from traditional labor law models and toward employer-employee 
relationships unprotected by the NLRA. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Splintered but Unbowed, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at C1 (noting that union membership has declined from 31.8% in 
1948, to 12.5% in 2004). 
 11. See Jan E. Gippo, Channels of Communication, SYMPHONY MAG., July–Aug. 2004, at 
91 (noting that musicians, whose tenure with their institutions is generally longer than that of 
management or board members, bring a “uniquely valuable” perspective to both daily 
institutional functioning and labor negotiations); see also Coppock, supra note 2, at 12 (“For 
more than thirty years, SPCO management and board leadership has changed on the average of 
every two to three years . . . .”). 
 12. See, e.g., PHILIP HART, ORPHEUS IN THE NEW WORLD: THE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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While the St. Paul model has not been tested before the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or by the courts, there is a danger 
that it violates American labor law and could place the musicians 
outside the ambit of the NLRA. Until the SPCO model has faced and 
survived such a test, musicians who desire more active participation 
in the stewardship of their institutions but are concerned about losing 
the protections of the NLRA, must walk a fine line to satisfy both 
mandates. The constituent groups of symphony orchestras must all 
work together to find ways to draw on the skills, talents and vision of 
their musicians without jeopardizing their status as employees under 
the NLRA. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the traditional structure 
of the American symphony orchestra and its adaptation of the 
industrial labor-management paradigm. It examines some of the 
forces that motivate orchestras to explore changes to both traditional 
bargaining style and the substance of their agreements. Finally, it 
considers the genesis of the SPCO agreement and its specific terms. 
Part II examines the administrative and judicial case law regarding 
the legal issues raised by the SPCO agreement in the context of 
American labor law. Part III analyzes the likely outcome of 
challenges to the legality of the joint management-musician 
committees and to the status of the SPCO musicians as employees 
under the NLRA. Part IV considers alternatives to the St. Paul model 
and recommends a means for musician involvement and institutional 
decision-making that fits within the strictures of the NLRA. 
AS AN AMERICAN CULTURAL INSTITUTION 96–119 (1st ed. 1973) (relating the history of the 
rise of the AFM and its successes in the orchestral field). ICSOM, established in 1962 and 
officially granted AFM conference status in 1969, has been especially effective at providing its 
members with the tools needed to achieve gains through collective bargaining. Id. at 114–19. 
Among these tools are an annual comparative chart of wages and working conditions, a 
conductor evaluation database, a printed periodical (SENZA SORDINO) circulated to all 
musicians in ICSOM orchestras, and an online discussion group called Orchestra-L. ICSOM: 
FORTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SYMPHONY AND OPERA MUSICIANS 51 
(Tom Hall ed., 2002) [hereinafter ICSOM: FORTY YEARS]. ICSOM and its sister symphonic 
musician conferences, the Regional Orchestra Players’ Association (ROPA) and the 
Organization of Canadian Symphony Musicians (OCSM), have influenced the AFM to devote 
additional resources to the symphonic sector, including the creation of a Symphony Department 
in 1983 (renamed the Symphonic Services Division in 1990). Id. at 52–55. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol20/iss1/13
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I. THE AMERICAN SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA 
A. Traditional Governance Structure 
American professional symphony orchestras are established as 
non-profit corporations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.13 The traditional orchestra governance structure has 
been described as a “three-legged stool,” with legs comprised of the 
chairman of the all-volunteer board of directors, the chief executive 
officer (CEO) of the organization, and the music director.14 In this 
traditional model, the board, which bears legal responsibility for the 
institution, delegates oversight of artistic matters to the music director 
and vests administrative responsibility in the CEO and his or her 
staff.15 
Within this framework, musicians have traditionally assumed 
limited responsibilities beyond their obligations as performers. The 
International Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians 
(ICSOM), whose members include musicians of fifty-one of 
America’s top orchestras, reported that for the 2004–05 season, all of 
the orchestras for which data was available utilized musicians to 
serve on committees hearing auditions of prospective members.16 In 
 13. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2005). The statute provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Exemption from taxation. An organization described in subsection (c) . . . shall be 
exempt from taxation under this subtitle . . . 
. . . .  
(c) List of exempt organizations. The following organizations are referred to in 
subsection (a):  
. . . .  
(3) Corporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for . . . charitable . . . or 
educational purposes . . . no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of 
any private shareholder or individual. 
Id. 
 14. Fogel, supra note 10, at 11.  
 15. Michael J. Schmitz, Musician Participation in Symphony Orchestra Management: 
The Milwaukee Symphony Orchestra Experience, 3 HARMONY 23, 25 (1996), available at 
http://www.soi.org/harmony/archive/3/Musician_Part_Schmitz.pdf. 
 16. WAGE SCALES AND CONDITIONS IN THE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA, ICSOM 
ORCHESTRAS, 2004–2005 SEASON, at 13 (Laura Brownell ed., 2005) [hereinafter ICSOM 
WAGE CHART]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the same season, forty-five out of forty-nine reporting orchestras 
utilized an artistic dismissal review committee, which included 
musicians.17 In forty-one out of forty-nine orchestras reporting, 
musicians served on artistic advisory committees, which typically 
function to channel player input on artistic matters, such as repertoire 
selection and programming.18 Less common is musician input into 
the selection of a new music director; only thirty orchestras reported 
that their contracts provided for such participation.19 
A more controversial way in which musicians have participated in 
institutional governance is by serving as members of the orchestra’s 
board of directors.20 Twenty-seven out of forty-nine reporting 
ICSOM orchestras include one or more musicians on their boards; in 
only twenty-one of those twenty-seven do the musician-board 
members have voting rights.21 Musicians in other orchestras have 
chosen instead to experiment with coordinated efforts to educate and 
interact with board members without formally serving on their 
orchestras’ boards.22 
 17. Id. at 14. 
 18. Id. at 12. 
 19. Id. at 15.  
 20. The wisdom and propriety of musicians serving as board members have been hotly 
debated amongst musicians and their advisors. See, e.g., Leonard Leibowitz, Musicians on 
Boards: Must We?, SENZA SORDINO, June 2003, at 6, available at http://www.icsom.org/pdf/ 
senza413.pdf. Leibowitz, who serves as ICSOM Legal Counsel, points out the dangers of 
tokenism, musician co-optation, and the potential for a real or perceived conflict of interest that 
may arise when a musician who has been elected to serve as a collective bargaining 
representative also serves on the orchestra’s Board of Directors. Id. But see Robert Levine, 
Musicians on Boards: A Useful Tool, SENZA SORDINO, June 2003, at 7, available at 
http://www.icsom.org/pdf/senza413.pdf. Levine, a past ICSOM chair, acknowledges the 
existence of risks, but touts musician service on boards as a way of building communication 
and understanding between the two disparate groups, provided that the musicians serve as true 
representatives of their colleagues and communicate what they observe in board meetings to the 
musicians they represent. Id. 
 21. ICSOM WAGE CHART, supra note 16, at 15. The number of board seats occupied by 
musicians ranges from one to nine. Id. The average number of seats held by musicians on 
ICSOM orchestra boards is 2.7. Id. 
 22. For example, the New Jersey Symphony Orchestra Committee members, who are 
elected by their peers to represent them in collective bargaining with their employer, attend 
every meeting of the Symphony’s Board of Directors and its Executive Committee without 
serving as members of the Board. E-mail from Robert Wagner, Orchestra Committee Chair, 
New Jersey Symphony, to Rochelle Gnagey Skolnick (Oct. 6, 2004) (on file with author). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol20/iss1/13
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B. Forces for Change 
Some commentators argue that symphony orchestras face 
unprecedented crises of funding and audience cultivation in the 
coming years,23 but an even greater concern is the decreased 
involvement of the music director.24 Henry Fogel, former president of 
the Chicago Symphony Orchestra Association, makes a convincing 
case for the necessity of reapportioning artistic responsibility.25 He 
argues that the model of symphony orchestra governance was 
developed during the era of the dictatorial music director.26 It has 
persisted to this day, even though a music director may only devote 
thirty-five to fifty percent of his or her professional time to the 
institution he or she nominally leads.27 Many aspects of the 
 23. See, e.g., Douglas J. Dempster, The Wolf Report and Baumol’s Curse: The Economic 
Health of American Symphony Orchestras in the 1990s and Beyond, 15 HARMONY 1, 1 (2002), 
available at http://www.soi.org/harmony/archive/15/Wolf_Report_Dempster.pdf. In his article, 
Dempster, Senior Associate Dean of the College of Fine Arts at the University of Texas, 
Austin, and former Dean of Academic Affairs at the Eastman School of Music, critiqued a 1992 
economic analysis of the symphonic industry undertaken by The Wolf Organization, Inc., and 
commissioned by the ASOL. Id. at 3. The Wolf report, based on the best available statistics and 
sound economic theory, projected an industry-wide deficit of over $64 million by 2000. Id. at 1. 
Nonetheless, the report’s predictions proved to be inaccurate, with the industry reporting strong 
growth during the ten years prior to the year 2000, in which it posted an industry-wide surplus 
of $84.5 million. Id. at 3. Even when the report was first issued, those in the industry greeted 
the predictions with varying degrees of sanguinity and alarm. Id. at 4 (citing Peter Pastreich, 
then-Executive Director of the San Francisco Symphony, as taking “the unflappable view that 
crises come and go,” but citing Deborah Borda, then-Managing Director of the New York 
Philharmonic, as viewing the Wolf Report as “a call to arms for the industry”). 
 24. See Fogel, supra note 10, at 14–16, 25. 
 25. See generally id. 
 26. Id. at 14-16. 
 27. Id. at 25. For an account that may call into question the novelty of this problem for 
today’s orchestras, see Philip Hart’s 1973 assertion that his study of orchestras revealed how 
“some must accept part-time, essentially nonresident musical direction, and how others face in 
the not too distant future losing the services of long-time ‘permanent’ conductors.” HART, 
supra note 12, at 457. Hart observed a “strong trend toward loosening the close bonds that have 
traditionally tied conductors to their orchestras in this country.” Id. New or not, the issue is one 
with which major orchestras indisputably grapple. For example, in September, 2004, the 
Pittsburgh Symphony announced it would replace its departing music director with three 
positions entitled “artistic advisor,” “principal guest conductor,” and “guest conductor,” each 
assuming varied responsibilities. Andrew Druckenbrod, Pittsburgh Symphony Hires Trio to 
Lead in 2005, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 2004, at A1. Although Andrew Davis, as 
artistic advisor, was slated to assume more responsibility than the other two positions, the chair 
of the search committee, which appointed him, announced that the committee “did not feel that 
any one person had the capability to meet the job or to provide the time for the job at this time.” 
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traditional orchestra CBA presume the presence and involvement of a 
strong music director, so an absentee music director can result in the 
gridlock and stagnation of certain key functions.28 One solution is to 
allocate powers traditionally held by a music director to other 
institutional players, including musicians. 
C. The St. Paul Chamber Orchestra Agreement 
1. The Process 
The SPCO, a 35-musician ensemble, has been in existence since 
1959.29 With a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation,30 the 
Id. Another search committee member, concertmaster Andres Cardenes, observed that “[t]he 
moniker music director has expectations that one human being cannot possibly fulfill.” Id. The 
Pittsburgh Symphony and Davis will utilize a Programming Advisory Committee, comprised of 
three musicians and three managers to help “develop programming for future seasons.” Id. 
(quoting Andrew Davis). The Baltimore Symphony Orchestra, during its search for a 
replacement for Music Director Yuri Temirkanov, reportedly considered a shift to a similar 
model before eventually appointing Marin Alsop as Music Director. Telephone Interview with 
Mary Plaine, Baltimore Symphony ICSOM Delegate (Oct. 24, 2004); see also Daniel J. Wakin, 
Baltimore Hires Director over Objections of Musicians, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at E3. 
Although the post Alsop will fill is that of a “traditional” music director, her contract requires 
her to spend only fourteen weeks each season conducting the Baltimore Symphony. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., Sarah Bryan Miller, You’re Not Fired!, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 
2004, at C3 (discussing the difficulty of removing symphony players in conformity with the 
CBA whose performance is below standard, particularly in the absence of a resident music 
director); see also Rochelle Gnagey Skolnick, Letter to the Editor, Symphony Musicians, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 27, 2004, at 36 (responding to Miller’s article and sharpening the 
focus on the problem of the absentee music director). 
 29. SPCO STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 3, at 8. Although the institution traces its roots to 
1959 and the founding of the Civic Philharmonic Society, it was not until 1968 that the Society 
accumulated the wherewithal to fund a full-time 22-member ensemble. Stephen Kelly, St. Paul 
Chamber Orchestra, in SYMPHONY ORCHESTRAS OF THE UNITED STATES: SELECTED PROFILES 
199, 199 (Robert R. Craven ed., 1986). The SPCO has distinguished itself from the majority of 
American symphony orchestras on two counts: First, its small number of players relative to the 
ICSOM average of seventy-nine, ICSOM WAGE CHART, supra note 16, at 2, and second, its 
focus on three areas of the orchestral repertoire (the Viennese Classical School, Baroque music 
and “music of our time,” defined as Twentieth Century and new music), SPCO STRATEGIC 
PLAN, supra note 3, at 17–18. 
 30. The Mellon Foundation, a New York non-profit corporation established in 1969, 
makes grants to symphony orchestras through its Music Program. The Andrew W. Mellon 
Foundation, History, http://www.mellon.org/MellonHistory.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
The stated goals of the program are to help orchestras: 
Strengthen leadership within the organization; Develop a lively and diversified work 
environment that promotes job satisfaction throughout the organization and that taps 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol20/iss1/13
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SPCO began a comprehensive Strategic Planning Process in 
September of 2000.31 The goal of this process was to provide a long-
term vision and strategy for the institution’s next ten years, including 
its fiftieth anniversary in 2009.32 Members of the board, staff, and 
orchestra participated in the process in roughly equal numbers.33 The 
resulting document (the “Strategic Plan”) included a vision statement, 
a statement of recommended program and financial initiatives, and a 
mandate for the creation of task forces to address certain issues 
facing the institution.34 
Based on the perceived success of the Strategic Planning Process, 
the parties agreed to negotiate the renewal of their CBA through a 
similarly collaborative effort, hoping to codify much of what was 
articulated in the Strategic Plan.35 Over the course of ten months and 
with the assistance of facilitators from the Symphony Orchestra 
Institute (SOI),36 a body called the Contract Renewal Group first 
the potential of musicians to act as artistic resources; Create a collaborative 
organizational culture that promotes alignment around common goals; Integrate artistic 
and institutional planning; Create coordinated programming across all activities of the 
organization that reflects and advances the organization’s artistic aspirations and that 
contributes to the advancement of the art form; Develop strong bonds between the 
orchestra and its community. 
The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Performing Arts, http://www.mellon.org/programs/ 
performingarts/performingarts.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
 In 2004, the Mellon Foundation awarded the SPCO a grant of $1.27 million. The Andrew 
W. Mellon Foundation, Grants, 2004, http://www.mellon.org/AnnualReports/2004/grants/ 
Grants-Annual%20Report-2004.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
 31. SPCO STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 3, at 8, 38. 
 32. Id. at 8. 
 33. Coppock, supra note 2, at 1. 
 34. See generally SPCO STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 3. 
 35. Boulian, supra note 2, at 55. 
 36. The SOI was a non-profit corporation founded in 1994 by Paul R. Judy and dissolved 
in March of 2005. Symphony Orchestra Institute, About the Institute, http://www.soi.org/about/ 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
Through programs of research, publications, forums, and education, the mission of the 
Symphony Orchestra Institute is to:  
• improve the effectiveness of symphony orchestra organizations;  
• to enhance the value they provide to their communities; and  
• help assure the preservation of such organizations as unique and valuable cultural 
institutions.  
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developed a methodology for the renewal process. Then, employing 
that methodology, it crafted an agreement designed to help make the 
Strategic Plan an operational reality.37 
2. Substance 
The resulting agreement includes several provisions that have 
stirred controversy and that present issues of genuine legal concern 
under American labor law.38 The agreement creates two joint 
management-musician committees that bear responsibility for a range 
of institutional governance functions, including many that the NLRB 
and courts have consistently determined to be supervisory or 
managerial.39 
For example, the Artistic Vision Committee’s (AVC) mandate is 
to “set the overall artistic direction and strategies of the organization, 
working within the financial parameters established by the Executive 
Committee of the Society.”40 The AVC’s responsibilities include 
programming of both the regular concert season and of educational 
activities, selecting conductors and guest artists, and “[o]rganizing 
ongoing discussion of the overall structure of the concert season, 
including, but not limited to, vacation weeks, number of performance 
weeks, performance venues, and series structure.”41 These are 
Paul R. Judy, The Symphony Orchestra Institute—Precepts and Direction, 1 HARMONY 1, 4 
(1995), available at http://www.soi.org/harmony/archive/1/Precepts_direction_Judy.pdf. In 
March, 2005, the SOI transferred its assets to the Eastman School of Music to help establish an 
Orchestra Musician Forum at the school. Press Release, Eastman School Receives $1.2 Million 
to Establish Orchestra Musician Forum (Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://www.rochester.edu/ 
Eastman/news/print.php?id=235. 
 37. Boulian, supra note 2, at 55. Although the process by which the agreement was 
reached is in itself controversial and worthy of discussion, that discussion is beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
 38. In addition to the provisions discussed in this Note, the Agreement involved an 
eighteen percent cut in wages and benefits for the musicians. Coppock, supra note 2, at 23. This 
wage reduction was part of overall organizational cuts made in response to funding shortfalls 
that became apparent during the renewal process. Id. at 21–22. One response to the reduction in 
wages was to include in the CBA a “Variable Additional Compensation Process.” SPCO 
Agreement, supra note 1, at 7–8. This scheme provides for a distribution of funds to employees 
in the event the organization posts a positive net operating budget in a given season. Id. 
 39. See infra Part II. 
 40. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 4. 
 41. Id. In the event the Society decides to engage a new music director, a Search 
Committee would be formed of the three musicians then serving on the AVC, two more 
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decisions traditionally made by the music director, artistic 
administration, and executive director, but occasionally with purely 
advisory input from musicians.42 Although the AVC is expected to 
“work closely with” other committees, artistic leadership, and staff, 
the AVC is, according to the Agreement, “ultimately responsible and 
accountable for making artistic policy decisions.”43  
Another committee, the Artistic Personnel Committee (APC), 
administers the personnel provisions of the CBA.44 The committee’s 
duties include overseeing the audition process; guiding the tenure 
review process, including selecting members of a tenure review 
committee and awarding tenure to successful musicians; creating and 
implementing programs to provide both individual performance 
feedback and professional growth opportunities; designing an 
appropriate intervention process for musicians who fail to meet the 
orchestra’s artistic standards; and recommending the dismissal of 
players for whom intervention was unsuccessful.45 These activities 
depart from the traditional structure in which artistic personnel 
decision-making is vested in the music director, and in which 
musicians’ roles are limited to serving on audition committees in an 
advisory or collaborative capacity or on “peer review” committees to 
musicians elected by their colleagues, and five individuals selected by the Society. Id. at 5. This 
committee would develop a list of suitable candidates and establish a selection process that 
would ensure candidates had conducted and been endorsed by the orchestra. Id. 
 42. See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
 43. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 4. This conflicts with or renders meaningless 
provision C.1, which states: 
SOCIETY’S AUTHORITY 
Music performance, programming, educational policies and programming, as well as 
all musical preparations incident thereto, shall be under the ultimate control and 
direction of the Society, which shall have sole authority and discretion to establish 
artistic performance and educational standards, such discretion to be exercised in 
conformity with this Agreement. 
Id. at 52. It also conflicts with the view of the orchestra’s CEO, Bruce Coppock, who has 
reportedly asserted that he would veto a committee decision that was “totally unacceptable” to 
the management. E-mail from Herb Winslow, Orchestra Committee Chair, SPCO, to Rochelle 
Gnagney Skolnick (Oct. 31, 2004) (on file with author). Nowhere in the CBA is this veto power 
reflected. Id. 
 44. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 5. 
 45. Id. at 5–6. As of April 17, 2006, both the Individual Feedback and Professional 
Growth processes were still under development. Telephone Interview with Leslie Shank, 
Orchestra Committee Chair as of May, 2005, SPCO (Apr. 17, 2006). 
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evaluate a music director’s dismissal of another musician in a purely 
appellate capacity.46 
Both the APC and the AVC are composed of three musicians and 
two members of management.47 The method of selecting the 
musician members is the same for both committees.48 One musician 
member is elected by the orchestra every two years.49 A second 
musician is selected by the existing members of the committee for a 
two-year term.50 The third musician is chosen from a list of 
volunteers and serves a one-year term.51 One musician member of 
each committee is selected by the other committee members to serve 
as a voting member of the Society’s Executive Committee.52 
Musicians serving on either the APC or the AVC receive eight 
service credits each concert season, or credit for the equivalent of 
approximately twenty hours of rehearsing or performing.53 
In addition to the APC and the AVC, SPCO musicians also serve 
on audition, tenure review and dismissal review committees.54 The 
eight-musician SPCO dismissal review committee, which is 
 46. See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
 47. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 4–6. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. During the first year of the agreement, this position was filled, on a one-time basis, 
by election for a one-year term. Id. 
 51. Id. During the first year of the agreement, the volunteer member was chosen at 
random. In subsequent years, this position is to be filled from an ordered list of the remaining 
volunteers. Later volunteers are placed at the end of this waiting list. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 5–6. Symphony orchestras use the term “service” to describe either a rehearsal 
or performance. Rehearsal services for the SPCO are generally two and one-half hours long; 
concerts are generally a maximum of two hours and ten minutes long. Id. at 23–26. SPCO 
musicians receive their annual salaries in exchange for being available to perform 240 services 
during the first three years of the contract, and 248 services in the last year. Id. at 22. Any 
musician who plays or is credited with more than that number receives additional pay at his or 
her individual service rate for each extra service. Id. The eight services credited to each player 
serving on the APC or AVC committees do not even begin to accurately reflect the amount of 
time the players actually spend discharging their committee responsibilities. Telephone 
Interview with Herb Winslow Orchestra Committee Chair, SPCO (Oct. 13, 2004). Although 
there is no mandatory contractual attendance policy for committee meetings, players who serve 
on committees “are expected to make their best efforts to attend meetings throughout the 
contract year.” SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 4. The CBA does not provide for sanctions in 
the event that a committee member fails to faithfully perform his or her committee 
responsibilities. Id. 
 54. Id. at 11 (auditions); id. at 12–13 (tenure review); id. at 15–17 (dismissal review). 
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convened to hear appeals of musicians dismissed for non-musical 
reasons, is common to many symphony orchestras.55 The SPCO 
audition committees depart from the norm in that they are composed 
entirely of musicians and bear full responsibility for evaluating 
candidates.56 This level of autonomy is unique among ICSOM 
orchestras.57 This independence extends even after hire, with 
decisions on a new player’s tenure made by a tenure committee.58 
The CBA provides for the creation of a five-musician tenure review 
committee after the appointment of any new orchestra member.59 
This committee is charged with evaluating and advising the musician 
throughout his or her probationary term and with recommending to 
the APC to either deny or grant tenure or to extend the probationary 
period.60 
In two provisions, the Agreement speaks to the potential legal 
consequences of the new roles assumed by musicians.61 The first, 
“CONTRACT INTENT RELATIVE TO NLRB RE. [sic] 
YESHIVA,” states that it is not the parties’ intent to place the 
musicians outside the coverage of the NLRA by virtue of their 
assumption of functions which might be viewed as managerial or 
supervisory.62 It also includes a limited waiver by the Society of its 
 55. ICSOM WAGE CHART, supra note 16, at 14. All but four of the ICSOM orchestras 
providing information on the subject reported having such an appellate committee to review 
artistic firings. Id. 
 56. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 11–12; see also ICSOM WAGE CHART, supra note 
16, at 13. 
 57. ICSOM WAGE CHART, supra note 16, at 13. 
 58. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 12–14. 
 59. Id. at 13. 
 60. Id. at 12-14. 
 61. Id. at 65. 
 62. Id. The full provision provides as follows: 
E.15 CONTRACT INTENT RELATIVE TO NLRB RE.[sic] YESHIVA 
The parties hereto are fully cognizant of the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
matter of NLRB vs. Yeshiva University. It is not their intention to create a situation 
which would place the Musicians of this Orchestra in danger of losing their status as 
“employees” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, by virtue of the 
assignment to them, collectively, of certain functions which might be viewed by the 
NLRB or by a court of competent jurisdiction, as “managerial” or “supervisory.” 
Therefore, with regard to activities permitted or required by this Agreement, and 
deemed “managerial” or “supervisory”, the Society specifically waives any right to 
claim any Musician is not an employee covered by the NLRA. 
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right to claim that any player is not a covered employee under the 
NLRA.63 
The only reason for the assignment of artistic leadership functions to the Musicians is 
that those functions bear a direct and important relationship to the artistic quality of the 
SPCO. As employees of the Society, the Musicians bring essential expertise to these 
artistic areas. 
Id. 
 63. Id. The enforceability of this waiver in the face of the employer’s repudiation is 
uncertain at best. A complete discussion of this question, while interesting, is beyond the scope 
of this Note. For purposes of this Note, I assume the waiver would have no effect on the 
NLRB’s statutorily-conferred power and duty to determine an appropriate bargaining unit. 
 Bargaining unit determinations are exclusively the province of the NLRB. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(c) (2005); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 152 (1941); see also Douds 
v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 241 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that the NLRB is not 
only empowered, but “indeed directed, to decide what is the appropriate bargaining unit in each 
case”). In Douds, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s order enjoining a union from 
insisting on a bargaining unit different from that approved by the NLRB. Id. at 282–83, 285. 
Necessarily included in the NLRB’s determination of what constitutes an appropriate 
bargaining unit is its determination of which members of an employer’s workforce are statutory 
employees, and which are supervisors or managers and, therefore, excluded from the Act’s 
coverage. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 674–75 (1980) (involving an 
employer opposed certification of union as bargaining representative on the ground that the 
bargaining unit the union sought to represent was composed of managerial or supervisory 
personnel who were not entitled to employee status under the Act).  
 The NLRB’s singular power to determine employee status also arises when an employer 
defends itself against an allegation of unfair labor practices. The employer will often claim that 
the NLRB has no jurisdiction to decide the matter because the affected workers are not 
statutorily-protected employees. See, e.g., NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 
571, 574–75 (1994) (involving an employer that defended unfair labor practice charge with 
argument that disciplined nurses were supervisors not entitled to protection). Even where both 
the employer and union agree that a given employee is not a supervisor, the NLRB may 
exercise its authority to decide otherwise. See, e.g., Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 75, 79–81 
(1974) (ruling that union president was also company supervisor despite objections and 
testimony of both union and employer). 
 The NLRB will also enforce waivers of certain statutory rights by both unions and 
employers when the waiver is “clear, knowing, and unmistakable, whether they be by 
contractual provision or by conduct.” N. Pac. Sealcoating, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 759, 759 (1992); 
see also Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705–07 (1983). In Northern Pacific 
Sealcoating, the NLRB observed that it was “reluctant to permit parties to use Board processes 
in a manner contrary to their contractual commitments or obligations.” 309 N.L.R.B. at 760. To 
“lend government sanction to undo the terms of a bargain which the parties themselves had 
struck . . . would be contrary to the statutory policy directed toward stabilizing the collective-
bargaining relationship.” Id. On the strength of that rationale, the NLRB’s refusal to enforce the 
waiver provision against the SPCO management would run contrary to the NLRA’s stated goal 
of promoting labor peace: 
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of 
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and 
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In the second provision, the Society indemnifies and holds 
harmless not only the members of the APC and the AVC committees, 
but also the local union, the AFM, and the elected members of the 
musicians’ bargaining committee.64 These entities are indemnified 
against any liability incurred in the discharge of their committee 
responsibilities and against a claim for unemployment compensation 
benefits.65 Indemnity applies regardless of the legal theory asserted 
against the indemnitee.66  
II. CASE LAW 
A. Defining Supervisors and Managers 
The NLRA covers professional employees,67 but section 2(3) of 
the Act expressly excludes “any individual employed as a supervisor” 
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their 
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their 
employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2005). 
 64. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 65. This provision provides as follows: 
E.16 INDEMNIFICATION 
The Society shall indemnify and hold harmless (a) all members of the Artistic Vision 
Committee, the Artistic Personnel Committee, and/or the Executive Committee, (b) the 
Twin Cities Musicians Union Local #30–73, the American Federation of Musicians 
and the officers and representatives of said unions, and (c) the elected members of the 
SPCO musicians’ bargaining committee, from any and all liability, loss, costs, damage 
or expense (including attorneys’ fees) which such indemnities may incur or sustain, 
arising from the committee member’s discharge of their committee responsibilities or 
from any claims for benefits under Minnesota Statutes Section 268.192, Subd. 1, 
asserted by an SPCO musician governed by this collective bargaining Agreement. Said 
indemnity shall apply to such claims regardless of the legal theory asserted (including 
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, failure to provide fair representation, equitable 
estoppel, breach of express or implied contract, violation of state or federal statute or 
regulation), but only if, as to each indemnitee described in (a) above, said indemnitee 
did not act dishonestly or in bad faith or in willful violation of the law. The Society 
shall have the right, but not the obligation, to select counsel and control the defense 
and settlement of any action against the indemnities should such need arise. 
Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (2005). A professional employee is defined as: 
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from its protections.68 The Act further defines a supervisor as “any 
individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,” to 
engage in one of twelve enumerated functions, including hiring, 
discharging, or disciplining other employees, or “recommend[ing] 
such action, if . . . the exercise of such authority is not of a merely 
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent 
judgment.”69 The same loyalty concerns that led Congress to 
statutorily exclude supervisors70 also led the NLRB and courts to 
establish a judicial exclusion for managerial employees who develop 
and implement the policies of the employer.71  
a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character 
as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the 
consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a 
character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in 
relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a 
field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized 
intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as 
distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from 
training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or (b) 
any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction 
and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work 
under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a 
professional employee as defined in paragraph (a). 
Id. 
 68. Id. § 152(3). 
 69. Id. § 152(11). The full text of the provision provides: 
The term “supervisor” means any individual having authority, in the interest of the 
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, 
or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their 
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the 
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, 
but requires the use of independent judgment. 
Id. 
 70. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), the Court cited the legislative 
history behind the Taft-Hartley amendments’ explicit exclusion of supervisors from the Act’s 
coverage as “strongly suggest[ing] that there were also other employees, much higher in the 
managerial structure, who were likewise regarded as so clearly outside the Act that no specific 
exclusionary provision was thought necessary.” Id. at 283 (emphasis added). 
 71. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980) (defining managerial 
employees as “those who ‘formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and 
making operative the decisions of their employer’” (quoting Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 288)). 
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1. The Managerial Exclusion 
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. is the United States Supreme Court’s 
seminal articulation of the managerial exclusion.72 In this case, the 
Court upheld the appellate court’s decision to deny enforcement of an 
NLRB order to bargain.73 At issue was the status of the company’s 
buyers, who the NLRB determined to be an appropriate bargaining 
unit.74 The NLRB reached this conclusion even though it also 
accepted the company’s contention that the buyers were managerial,75 
because it believed that there was no conflict of interest between the 
buyers’ jobs and their participation in a labor organization.76 
Rejecting the NLRB’s conflict of interest standard,77 the Court 
asserted that Congress intended to exclude all managerial employees, 
and remanded the case so that the NLRB could determine whether 
the buyers were in fact managerial.78 The standard adopted by the 
NLRB on remand and later endorsed by the courts defined 
managerial employees as those who “formulate and effectuate 
management policies by making operative the decisions of their 
employer.”79 Any employee who meets this standard is outside the 
coverage of the Act.80  
 72. 416 U.S. 267. 
 73. Id. at 295. The NLRB rejected the company’s contention that buyers who were also 
union members might be tempted to favor union interests in the exercise of their “authority to 
commit the company’s credit, select vendors, and negotiate purchase prices.” Id. at 271. 
Finding any possible conflict of interest “unsupported conjecture,” the NLRB asserted that the 
buyers’ latitude was circumscribed by the employer and that “‘any possible temptation to allow 
sympathy for sister unions to influence such decisions could effectively be controlled by the 
Employer.’” Id. (quoting Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 431, 431 (1971)). 
 74. Id. (citing Bell Aerospace, 190 N.L.R.B. at 431). 
 75. Id. at 270–71. 
 76. Id. at 271–72. 
 77. In an order denying reconsideration of its original decision, the NLRB explained that 
the “fundamental touchstone” when determining whether a managerial employee should be 
excluded from the Act’s protection was “whether the duties and responsibilities of any 
managerial employee . . . do or do not include determinations which should be made free of any 
conflict of interest which could arise if the person involved was a participating member of a 
labor organization.” Bell Aerospace Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 827, 828 (1972). 
 78. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 289–90. 
 79. Id. at 288 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 
(1947)). 
 80. Id. at 289–90. 
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Six years later, the Court added depth to its managerial exclusion 
when it held in NLRB v. Yeshiva University that faculty who 
participated in forming and implementing University policies were 
excluded from coverage.81 The NLRB rejected the University’s 
assertion that the faculty were managerial and concluded that, as 
professional employees, they were entitled to protection under the 
Act.82 The NLRB rested this conclusion on its assessment that the 
faculty exercised its decision-making authority on a “‘collective 
rather than individual basis,’” that the faculty acted in their own 
interest rather than the employer’s, and that final authority rested 
with the University’s board of trustees.83 In arguments before the 
Court, the NLRB abandoned the first and third of these rationales, 
leaving the Court to consider only the second—whether it was 
enough that the faculty acted in their own interest.84 
The Court, emphasizing a record replete with examples of the 
faculty’s authority in many facets of governance,85 found that the 
faculty’s interests in this context were in fact inseparable from the 
University’s.86 The faculty’s reliance on their professional judgment 
 81. 444 U.S. 672, 679 (1980). 
 82. Id. at 678. 
 83. Id. (quoting Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 (1975)). The Court offered a 
scathing assessment of the NLRB’s three-part rationale as merely “a litany to be repeated in 
case after case” by the NLRB when dealing with university faculty. Id. at 685. The Court also 
repeatedly emphasized the NLRB’s failure to make findings of fact. Id. at 678–79, 691. In 
contrast, the dissent emphasized the Board’s examination of the “voluminous record” in the 
case, noting that it was developed over five months of hearings and comprised more than 4600 
pages of testimony and 200 exhibits. Id. at 696 and n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice 
Brennan’s dissent was joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun. Id. at 691. 
 84. Id. at 685. 
 85. The faculty engaged in university-wide governance through participation on two 
elected committees: a student-faculty advisory council and a Faculty Review Committee, whose 
recommendations to the President or Dean for the adjustment of faculty grievances were also 
purely advisory. Id. at 675–76. Within individual schools, the faculty were responsible, through 
both formal and informal processes, for effective determination of “curriculum, grading system, 
admission and matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course schedules.” Id. at 676. 
Faculty also made recommendations, the “overwhelming majority” of which were 
implemented, with regard to faculty employment status, including hiring, tenure, promotion and 
termination. Id. at 677. The Court agreed with the appellate decision, which found that although 
they acted in a nominally advisory capacity, the faculty were “‘in effect, substantially and 
pervasively operating the enterprise.’” Id. at 691 (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 
686, 698 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
 86. Id. at 688. The Court asserted that the “quest for academic excellence and institutional 
distinction” was an administrative policy to which the University expected the faculty to 
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did not preclude their alignment with management.87 Indeed, the 
Court reasoned that the divided loyalty concerns, which prompted the 
managerial and supervisory exclusions, would only be exacerbated if 
the faculty were able to enjoy a high degree of independence in their 
exercise of judgment.88 Fundamentally, Yeshiva holds that an 
employee who is “aligned with management” warrants managerial 
exclusion.89 
adhere. Id. Inquiry into whether this policy created an expectation of conformity to a goal of a 
personal or a professional nature was “fruitless” when the two goals were “essentially the 
same.” Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 689–90. “The university requires faculty participation in governance because 
professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and implementation of academic 
policy . . . . It is clear that Yeshiva and like universities must rely on their faculties to participate 
in the making and implementation of their policies.” Id. at 689 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). The Court also noted that the extent to which faculty recommendations were 
implemented was “no ‘mere coincidence,’” as suggested by the dissent. Id. at 690 n.28 (quoting 
id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). “Rather this is an inevitable characteristic of the 
governance structure adopted by universities like Yeshiva.” Id. 
 89. Id. at 683 (“Although the Board has established no firm criteria for determining when 
an employee is so aligned, normally an employee may be excluded as managerial only if he 
represents management interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions that 
effectively control or implement employer policy.”) (footnote omitted). 
 It is worth noting that the Court disavowed any attempt to remove all professionals from 
the Act’s coverage through the managerial exclusion. Id. at 690 (“We certainly are not 
suggesting an application of the managerial exclusion that would sweep all professionals 
outside the Act in derogation of Congress’ expressed intent to protect them.”). In dicta, the 
Court cited with approval a number of NLRB decisions in which decision-making “limited to 
the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have been assigned” did 
not exclude a professional from coverage even if divided loyalty was arguably a concern. Id. 
(emphasis added); see also id. at 690 n.30 (mentioning among the non-excluded professions 
architects, engineers, nurses, and broadcast newswriters). The Court noted that the NLRB had 
developed a test specific to the health care industry that questioned whether allegedly 
managerial decisions were in fact “incidental to” or “in addition to” the professionals’ treatment 
of patients. Id. at 690. The Court determined that Congress had “expressly approved” this test in 
hearings for the 1974 amendments of the Act. Id.  
 However, the Court’s approval of this test did not last. See NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. 
Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 576–78 (1994) (rejecting NLRB’s application of an “incidental to” 
patient treatment test for supervisory decisions of nurses). The Health Care court also rejected 
the NLRB’s reliance on legislative history for justification, reversing its Yeshiva position that 
the NLRB had developed a consistent test prior to the amendments and testily asserting that 
“‘[i]t is the function of the courts and not the Legislature, much less a Committee of one House 
of the Legislature, to say what an enacted statute means.’” Id. at 582 (quoting Pierce v. 
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988)).  
 Apparently drawing on the distinction, spelled out in the supervisory exclusion in 29 
U.S.C. § 152(11), that an employee is a supervisor if his or her exercise of authority is “not of a 
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment,” the Yeshiva 
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2. The Supervisory Exclusion 
The supervisory exclusion in section 2(11) of the NLRA provides 
a three-part test to determine if an employee is a supervisor.90 The 
first part requires a determination as to whether the employee has 
authority to engage in any of the twelve statutorily specified activities 
discussed previously.91 This is a straightforward factual inquiry. The 
second and third parts of the test require interpretation of the statute’s 
two modifying phrases. The first, which the Supreme Court 
considered in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 
asks whether an employee’s exercise of authority is undertaken “in 
the interest of the employer.”92 The second asks whether the exercise 
of that authority requires the use of “independent judgment,” and was 
clarified by the Court in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, 
Inc.93 
In Health Care, the Court found that the NLRB created a false 
dichotomy when it distinguished between acts a nurse undertook in 
connection with patient care and those she undertook in the interest 
of her employer, a nursing home.94 In a hearing before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) on a complaint alleging that the 
employer had improperly disciplined four staff nurses, the employer 
argued that the nurses were supervisors and therefore not protected 
by the NLRA.95 The nurses, who were the senior ranking employees 
at the nursing home seventy-five percent of the time, were 
responsible for ensuring adequate staffing and distribution of daily 
work assignments; overseeing the nurse aides’ work, including 
grievance resolution, discipline, and performance evaluations; and 
court asserted that an employee is only aligned with management if his or her activities fall 
“outside the scope of the duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals.” 444 
U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). However, the Court’s subsequent decisions call into question the 
validity of this test. See, e.g., Health Care, 511 U.S. at 580 (criticizing the NLRB’s statutory 
dichotomy). 
 90. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 573–74. 
 91. Id. at 574; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2005), quoted supra note 69. 
 92. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 574. 
 93. 532 U.S. 706 (2001). 
 94. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 577. The Court compared this dichotomy to the one the 
Board created in Yeshiva, see supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 95. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 575.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol20/iss1/13
p403 Skolnick book pages.doc  7/21/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  Control, Collaboration or Coverage 423 
 
 
 
reporting to management.96 The ALJ found that because the nurses 
were primarily concerned with the residents’ well-being, they did not 
perform their supervisory work “in the interest of the employer.”97 
The NLRB agreed with the ALJ,98 but the Sixth Circuit reversed;99 
the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s reversal.100 Observing 
that “[p]atient care is the business of a nursing home,” the Court 
declared that even if direction of subordinates was only incidental to 
caring for patients (who were, after all, the employer’s customers), it 
was still undertaken “in the interest of the employer.”101 
The Court acknowledged, as it had in Yeshiva, that inherent in the 
Act was “some tension” between the coverage of professional 
employees and the exclusion of supervisors; however, the Court 
refused to permit the NLRB to resolve that tension by “distorting the 
statutory language.”102 The Court reminded the NLRB that the 
statute’s supervisory exclusion applies to professionals and non-
professionals alike, even though professionals may be more apt to 
take on supervisory responsibilities.103 Any attempt on the part of the 
NLRB to “creat[e] legal categories inconsistent with [the Act’s] 
meaning” is an impermissible method of enforcement.104 
 96. Id. The staff nurses at issue were licensed practical nurses. Id. at 574–75. There were 
also registered nurses among the nine to eleven staff nurses. Id. Subordinate to them were 
between fifty and fifty-five nurses’ aides. Id. 
 97. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 306 N.L.R.B. 63, 68, 70 (1992). 
 98. Id. at 63 n.1. 
 99. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1993). The Sixth 
Circuit previously found the NLRB’s test for determining the supervisory status of nurses to be 
inconsistent with the statute. See Beverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548, 1556 (6th Cir. 
1992); NLRB v. Beacon Light Christian Nursing Home, 825 F.2d 1076, 1079–80 (6th Cir. 
1987). 
 100. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 584. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Health Care 
was intended to resolve a conflict among the circuits regarding the validity of the NLRB’s rule. 
Id. at 576. 
 101. Id. at 577 (emphasis added). The Court returned to a definition of the phrase “in the 
interest of the employer” that it had developed almost fifty years earlier in Packard Motor Car 
Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488 (1947) (“Every employee, from the very fact of his 
employment in the master’s business, is required to act in his interest.”). Health Care, 511 U.S. 
at 578. In Packard Motor, the Court adopted an interpretation consistent with the ordinary 
meaning of the phrase and held that it encompassed acts undertaken within the scope of 
employment or on the employer’s authorized business. Packard Motor, 330 U.S. at 488–89. 
 102. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 581. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 580. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p403 Skolnick book pages.doc  7/21/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
424 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 20:403 
 
 
 
In Kentucky River, the Court rejected another attempt by the 
NLRB to create a categorical exemption, this time from the 
“independent judgment” prong of the supervisor test.105 The NLRB 
found that six registered nurses were not supervisors because their 
direction of less-skilled employees was an exercise of “ordinary 
professional or technical judgment.”106 Therefore, it was not an 
exercise of “independent judgment” as required by the statute.107 
Expressing approval for prior NLRB decisions that turned on the 
degree of discretion in an employee’s exercise of “independent 
judgment,”108 the Court found that in this case, the NLRB abandoned 
the degree test and improperly adopted an unwarranted categorical 
exclusion for ordinary professional or technical judgment.109 Further, 
the NLRB inexplicably confined its application of the new test to 
only one of the twelve supervisory functions: “responsibly to 
direct.”110 The Court found that neither of these limitations was 
justified by the text of the Act.111 Moreover, the NLRB’s attempt to 
preserve coverage for professional employees by developing a unique 
standard for assessing their exercise of independent judgment was 
inconsistent with the Health Care court’s policy of applying the test 
for supervisory status similarly to both professional and non-
professional employees.112 
B. Joint Employer-Employee Governance Committees 
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA declares employer-dominated labor 
organizations to be an unfair labor practice on the part of the 
 105. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 721 (2001). 
 106. Id. at 713. 
 107. Id. at 709, 713. 
 108. Id. at 713–14 (citing Chevron Shipping Co., 317 N.L.R.B. 379, 381 (1995); 
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1170, 1173 (1949)). 
 109. Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 714. With the creation of a categorical exclusion, the Court 
asserted, “[l]et the judgment be significant and only loosely constrained by the employer; if it is 
‘professional or technical’ it will nonetheless not be independent.” Id. (footnote omitted). If the 
NLRB was allowed to apply the “professional or technical judgment” standard to the exercise 
of every supervisory task, the result would be the virtual elimination of the existence of a 
supervisory class from the Act. Id. at 715. 
 110. Id. at 715–16. 
 111. Id. at 716. 
 112. Id. at 721. 
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employer.113 This prohibition is based in Congress’ concern over the 
employer practice of creating a sham “company union” to circumvent 
their employees’ efforts to obtain meaningful representation.114 These 
sham unions were common at the time of the Act’s passage and 
created the illusion of representation. In reality, they allowed 
employers to retain ultimate control over the employment 
relationship and undermined the employees’ ability to freely choose 
their own representatives.115 In the modern era, “employee 
participation” programs, which allow for employer-employee 
cooperation, have raised new challenges for the NLRB and courts 
when deciding cases of alleged section 8(a)(2) violations.116 
 113. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2005). The statute provides: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- 
. . . .  
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor 
organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to 
rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 156 of this 
title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with 
him during working hours without loss of time or pay. 
Id.  
 114. JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 342 (2d 
ed. 1999). 
 115. Id. While these sham unions took many different forms, including “representation 
plans,” “shop committees” and “communications programs,” they were all initiated and 
controlled by company management and acted solely in an advisory capacity. Id. Management 
always retained ultimate decision-making authority. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Naomi Knitting Plant, 328 N.L.R.B. 1279 (1999). In Naomi Knitting, the 
NLRB affirmed an ALJ’s order for the disestablishment of a company-dominated “Design 
Team” that had been created in the wake of a failed union organizing drive. Id. at 1279. The 
ALJ’s decision acknowledged that there was “[n]o doubt” that “both management and 
employees at Naomi have benefited from the communication and results achieved through the 
Design Team as it has been created, structured, and operated.” Id. at 1301. Nonetheless, “[t]he 
remedy for domination is an order to disestablish.” Id.; see also GETMAN, supra note 114, at 
348–53. 
 A 1994–95 study of worker preferences showed that the majority of American workers 
want greater workplace participation and cooperative relationships with management. RICHARD 
B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 4–5 (1999) (reporting the results of the 
authors’ Worker Representation and Participation Study). At the same time, the majority of 
workers favor a “measure of independence and protection of that independence in their dealings 
with management.” Id. at 5. Specifically, workers want “significant independence” in selecting 
their own representatives to participate in joint decision-making. Id.  
 Workers’ focus on maintaining a voice not dominated by their employers echoes legal 
concerns that a relaxation of the protections afforded by section 8(a)(2) would result in a 
“diminution of the bargaining power and effectiveness of lawfully-recognized unions.” Robert 
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To prove that a joint employer-employee committee violates 
section 8(a)(2), a petitioner must first show that the committee is a 
“labor organization” within the meaning of section 2(5).117 This 
inquiry is tripartite, requiring 1) employee participation with 2) a 
purpose, at least in part, of “dealing with” the employer over 3) 
“grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work.”118 Once the committee is shown 
to be a labor organization, the petitioner must then demonstrate that 
the employer has dominated or interfered with the committee’s 
formation or administration or has otherwise impermissibly 
supported the committee in violation of section 8(a)(2).119 
B. Moberly, The Worker Participation Conundrum: Does Prohibiting Employer-Assisted Labor 
Organizations Prevent Labor-Management Cooperation?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 331, 355 (1994). 
Although Moberly acknowledges that section 8(a)(2) has largely accomplished Congress’ goal 
of eliminating traditional company unions, he argues that it is still valuable. Id. at 345–46. In 
the absence of section 8(a)(2) strictures, an employer could use a cooperative committee “to 
place mandatory subjects of bargaining before company-dominated groups.” Id. at 355. In that 
scenario, the company avoids dealing with the employees’ legitimate representative, and that 
representative, the union, is further weakened and marginalized. Id. 
 117. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2005). The NLRA defines “labor organization” as: 
[A]ny organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee 
or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or 
in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates 
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. 
Id. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Electromation, Inc., v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (7th Cir. 1994). The usual 
remedy for employer domination of a labor organization in violation of section 8(a)(2) is an 
order to disestablish. PATRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2520 (4th ed. 
2002). Where an employer has not dominated but has merely provided improper assistance to a 
union, the NLRB may order the employer to withdraw recognition of the union until it receives 
proper NLRB certification. Id.; see also Chi. Rawhide Mfg. Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 727, 737 (1953), 
enforcement denied on other grounds, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955) (holding that where 
employer “assisted, contributed support to, and interfered with the administration of” but did 
not dominate employee association, the proper remedy was an order to withdraw recognition 
pending certification and to cease giving effect to CBA with the association). Where an 
employer has merely improperly influenced the negotiation of a CBA with a union whose 
majority status is not in doubt, the NLRB may order the CBA set aside and bar the employer 
from further interference in the administration of the union. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 75, 
75 (1974). In Jeffrey, the ALJ determined and the NLRB confirmed that the union president 
was also a company supervisor, despite the fact that both company and union denied his 
supervisory status. Id. at 79. The ALJ found that “‘[s]uch a mingling of supervisory and 
employee-representative function . . . denied the Respondent’s employees their rights under the 
Act to be represented in collective-bargaining matters by individuals who have a single-minded 
loyalty to their interest’” and violated section 8(a)(2). Id. at 83 (quoting E.E.E. Co., Inc., 171 
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1. Labor Organization: “Dealing with” the Employer 
Two parts of the test to determine if a committee is a labor 
organization, employee participation and the subject matter discussed 
by the committee, are straightforward factual inquiries.120 The 
Supreme Court mandates a broad interpretation of the phrase 
“dealing with” in determining whether a committee’s activities bring 
it within the section 2(5) definition of a labor organization.121 In its 
N.L.R.B. 982 (1968)); see also Vanguard Tours, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 250, 250 (1990), enforced 
in part and denied in part, 981 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that employer violated section 
8(a)(2) “by maintaining a system whereby shop stewards who performed the function of 
grievance representative for the Union, and who submitted bargaining demands and participated 
in negotiations on behalf of the Union, were supervisors of the very employees they were 
supposed to represent”). 
 120. While employee participation should be readily discerned, the NLRB and courts have 
been tempted to complicate the inquiry by suggesting that employees participating in 
committees must be acting as representatives. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 
1002 (1992) (Devaney, Member, concurring) (“[C]ontrary to my colleagues, I would not be 
inclined to find that an employee group constituted a statutory labor organization unless the 
group acted as a representative of other employees.”). 
 See also NLRB v. Webcor Packaging, Inc., 118 F.3d 1115, 1120–21 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998). In Webcor, the Sixth Circuit rejected the employer’s argument 
that a plant council was not a labor organization because it was merely a suggestion forum, 
rather than a representative body. Id. The court found instead that the employees on the council 
did represent other employees. Id. Asserting that the NLRB had not determined whether an 
employee group could meet the statutory definition of a labor organization if it was not 
representative, the court found that its factual determination had saved it from having to address 
this “novel legal question.” Id. at 1120. 
 For a more thorough interpretation of section 2(5), see Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 
1007 n.13 (Raudabaugh, Member, concurring). Member Raudabaugh dismissed the argument 
that representation should be an “additional defining characteristic” of a labor organization. Id. 
In his view, an “employee representation committee or plan” is named in section 2(5) as just 
one type of entity that may be a labor organization. Id. He pointed out that “[t]he term 
‘representation’ does not modify the other entities listed in the statutory definition and does not 
appear in the latter part of the definition along with ‘participation’ and ‘dealing with.’” Id. This 
view of the “employee representation committee,” as a distinct type of labor organization, is 
bolstered by the fact, exposed by Member Devaney, that “employee representation plan” was 
used in legislative committee testimony before the passage of the NLRA’s predecessor, the 
National Industrial Recovery Act, “as a term of art to describe scores of organizations.” Id. at 
999–1000 (Devaney, Member, concurring) (citing Hearing on S. 2926 Before the S. Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d sess., reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 1546–52 (1959) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY]). These representation plans were so numerous and varied (covering over a million 
employees by 1934) that the phrase “employee representation committees” was inserted into the 
text of the statute expressly as a way of capturing their full scope. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. 
at 1000 (Devaney, Member, concurring). 
 121. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 210–12 (1959). 
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1959 decision in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., the Court held that the 
Fifth Circuit had erred in interpreting the “dealing with” requirement 
of section 2(5) as synonymous with the more limited concept of 
“bargaining with” an employer.122 Citing the statute’s plain language, 
its legislative history, and its subsequent judicial interpretation, the 
Court found no support for the Fifth Circuit’s narrow reading of the 
phrase.123 Even though the employee committees in Cabot Carbon 
had not negotiated a formal collective bargaining agreement with 
their employer, the Court held that the committees dealt with the 
employer in the requisite manner.124 The committees handled 
grievances and made proposals to the employer regarding matters 
including work schedules, wages, and working conditions.125 These 
activities, according to the Court, constituted “dealing with” the 
employer for purposes of section 2(5).126 
The requirement of “dealing with” the employer was further 
defined in one of the two recent cases that attempted to flush out the 
boundaries of section 8(a)(2).127 In Electromation v. NLRB, the 
Seventh Circuit enforced the NLRB’s order for the disestablishment 
of several “action committees.”128 The employer created the 
committees to address employee discontent over the employer’s 
unilateral decision to change certain aspects of company policy.129 
The committees, which included both employees and members of 
management, met to discuss means of improving worker satisfaction 
and presented proposals based on these discussions to the company’s 
management.130 Management then had the option of responding to the 
 122. Id. at 212–13. 
 123. Id. at 210. The Court noted that Congress expressly rejected an amendment to the 
original legislation which would have substituted the term “bargaining collectively” for 
“dealing.” Id. at 211 (citing Hearing on S. 1958 Before the S. Comm. on Education and Labor, 
74th Cong. 66–67, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 120, at 1442–43). The 
Court also cited judicial interpretation of section 2(5) both before and after the Taft-Hartley 
amendments. Id. at 212 n.11, n.14. 
 124. Id. at 212-13. 
 125. Id. at 207–08. 
 126. Id. at 213–14. 
 127. Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 128. Id. at 1151. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 1152–53. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol20/iss1/13
p403 Skolnick book pages.doc  7/21/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  Control, Collaboration or Coverage 429 
 
 
 
committees’ proposals.131 The Seventh Circuit cited with approval the 
NLRB’s definition of “dealing with” as a “bilateral mechanism,” 
wherein proposals from the committee concerning conditions of 
employment receive “real or apparent consideration” from 
management.132 
In the second recent case regarding section 8(a)(2), E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., the NLRB explained that a “bilateral mechanism” 
normally involves a “pattern or practice” of the employee 
committees’ presentation of proposals to management.133 
Management could then either accept or reject the proposals without 
engaging in the kind of compromise that typifies bargaining.134 Du 
Pont involved six safety committees and one fitness committee, all of 
which included both employees and members of management.135 
Decisions were made by consensus of all the members of a given 
committee.136 Noting that discussion took place between employees 
and management within each committee, the NLRB found that the 
managers’ capacity to reject employee proposals from within the 
committees was “only a difference of form,” rather than of substance, 
from the kind of “dealing with” management that would have 
occurred had the managers rejected committee proposals from 
outside the committee structure.137 
2. Labor Organization: Employer Domination 
An employer may impermissibly dominate either the formation or 
administration of an employer-employee committee.138 Although 
Congress has not provided a complete list of the ways in which an 
 131. Id. at 1152. 
 132. Id. at 1161 (citing Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 n.21, 997–98 (1992)). 
 133. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993). 
 134. Id. at 894. 
 135. Id. at 893. 
 136. Id. at 895. This process was outlined in du Pont’s Personal Effectiveness Process 
(PEP) handbook: “‘[C]onsensus is reached when all members of the group, including its leader, 
are willing to accept a decision.’” Id. This process effectively gave the management member(s) 
of any committee veto power over any employee proposal. Id. 
 137. Id. (“As a practical matter, if management representatives can reject employee 
proposals, it makes no real difference whether they do so from inside or outside the 
committee.”). 
 138. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2005).  
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employer might dominate such an organization, it has suggested 
several possibilities: employer determination of or control over the 
structure of the committee, employer participation in the committee’s 
internal management or elections, or employer control over the 
agenda or procedure of committee meetings.139  
In Electromation, the employer both unilaterally imposed the 
“action committees” on its employees and determined the purposes of 
the committees.140 The employer also set the number of employees 
that could participate in each committee and designated the members 
of management who would serve.141 These members of management 
determined whether any of the committees’ proposals would be 
presented to upper management.142 The influence of the employer, 
including its financial and logistical support of the committee 
meetings, provided sufficient evidence to support the NLRB’s 
finding of employer domination and interference.143  
 139. S. COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, S. 
REP. NO. 573, at 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 120, at 2309–10. 
After listing several possible forms of interference, the Report acknowledges:  
It is impossible to catalog all the practices that might constitute interference, which 
may rest upon subtle but conscious economic pressure exerted by virtue of the 
employment relationship. The question is one of fact in each case. And where several 
of these interferences exist in combination, the employer may be said to dominate the 
labor organization by overriding the will of the employees. 
Id. 
 140. Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (7th Cir. 1994). The employees 
were not initially positive about the committees: “The employees did not want more meetings 
or committees; rather, they wanted solutions to the numerous problems they had identified.” Id. 
at 1152. It was only when it became clear that the committees were the only solution the 
employer was willing to consider that the employees agreed to participate. Id. In the end, the 
employer chose not to create a committee to address one of the issues about which the 
employees were most seriously concerned—the lack of a wage increase. Id. at 1169. 
 141. Id. at 1152. Additionally, after posting sign-up sheets for employees to volunteer for 
committee service, Electromation refused to allow two employees who had signed up for 
multiple committees to serve on more than one. Id. After initially announcing that the 
volunteers for a given committee would decide who would serve, the employer made a 
unilateral determination without giving the employees an opportunity to vote on the members. 
Id. 
 142. Id. at 1170. The court noted that this “effectively put the employer on both sides of the 
bargaining table.” Id. 
 143. Id. Electromation compensated committee members for their service and provided the 
committees with supplies and meeting space. Id. Both the Board and the court were careful to 
point out that compensating employees for time spent on committees was not per se a violation 
of section 8(a)(2). Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 998 n.31 (1992); Electromation, 35 
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Similarly, in du Pont, the NLRB held that the employer’s veto 
power over committee actions, its role in the establishment of each 
committee’s agenda, its control over both the number and selection of 
employees to serve on the committees, and its ability to “change or 
abolish any of the committees at will” cumulatively established the 
employer’s domination over the administration of the committees.144 
3. Joint Committees that Perform Managerial Functions 
Where a joint employer-employee committee merely assumes 
duties that are essentially managerial or supervisory, the NLRB has 
not held the committee to be violation of section 8(a)(2).145 In Crown 
Cork & Seal Co., the employer used a management system that 
delegated authority to employees through committees and teams of 
various types.146 The four thirty-three-member Production Teams, 
labeled A, B, C, and D, included the majority of the plant’s 
approximately 150 employees; one member of each team was a 
member of management.147 These teams had authority to “decide and 
do” with regard to such workplace issues as “production, quality, 
training, attendance, safety, maintenance, and discipline short of 
suspension or discharge.”148 This included the authority to stop 
production lines, recall damaged shipments, and investigate and 
correct safety problems. The teams also scheduled employee training 
F.3d at 1170 (citing Chi. Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1955)). 
 144. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895–96 (1993). The company 
controlled the committees’ agendas through the management members of the committees, who 
served as either the committee leader or the “resource” (defined as a monitor or advisor). Id. at 
896. Du Pont’s PEP handbook, which guided the committees’ activities, provided that the 
leader, resource, and a scribe would confer before and after each meeting to set the meeting 
agenda and then evaluate the meeting and plan improvements for the next meeting. Id. at 895 
n.15. 
 145. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699, 699 (2001); see also Ga. Power Co., 10-
CA-33361, 2004 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 355, at *2 (June 30, 2004); Gen. Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 
1232, 1235 (1977). 
 146. Crown Cork, 334 N.L.R.B. at 699–700. The employees were not represented by a 
union and there was no evidence of union organizing activity. Id. The structure created by the 
employer was guided by the “Socio-Tech System.” Id. The essence of the “Socio-Tech System” 
was the delegation of managerial authority to “descending levels of committees which make 
decisions by consensus.” Id. at 701. 
 147. Id. at 699. 
 148. Id. at 704. 
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and administered the plant’s absentee program. In addition, the teams 
could implement a progressive discipline plan, including a “social 
contract” for any team member whose performance or behavior was 
at issue.149 A breach of the “social contract” could result in the team 
recommending the member’s suspension or discharge.150  
At the next administrative level were an Organizational Review 
Board (ORB), an Advancement Certification Board (ACB) and a 
Safety Committee.151 These committees were composed of two 
members from each of the four production teams and members of 
management.152 These three committees reported to a fifteen-member 
Management Team, which was in turn accountable solely to the plant 
manager.153 The ORB ensured consistent administration of plant 
policies by the four teams, recommended modifications to terms and 
conditions of employment, and reviewed team recommendations of 
disciplinary action against team members.154 The ACB administered 
a program that rewarded employees with higher salaries for increased 
skill levels.155 The Safety Committee reviewed accident reports and 
recommended changes to improve workplace safety.156 Although the 
committees were required to operate within the parameters 
established by the Management Team and the plant manager, review 
of committee recommendations was extremely deferential. In fact, 
the plant manager testified that he could not recall overruling any of 
the committees’ recommendations.157 
The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s recommendation and dismissed the 
complaint that the Crown Cork committees violated section 8(a)(2), 
holding that the committees did not exist to “deal with” management, 
but rather were created by management for the express purpose of 
delegating managerial functions to employees.158 The fact that none 
 149. Id. at 699. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 699–700. 
 152. Id. at 699. The committees had about a dozen members each. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 700. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. In many instances, decisions of the ORB were implemented even before they 
reached the plant manager for consideration. Id. 
 158. Id. at 701–02. The NLRB cited General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977), as 
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of the committees had “final and absolute” authority did not negate 
this conclusion.159 The committees were analogous to the various 
levels of management that comprise a company’s traditional “chain 
of command,” in which most supervisors do not have final decision-
making authority either.160 Similarly, the Crown Cork committees, 
although they only acted within certain “delegated spheres of 
authority,” were management within those spheres.161 
IV. ANALYSIS 
When orchestras consider expanding their musicians’ traditional 
roles to include a greater responsibility for institutional governance, 
they must first ask whether the model under consideration 
jeopardizes their status as employees under the NLRA. In the case of 
the SPCO CBA, the answer to that question is likely that it does. 
an example of where “‘managerial functions [were] flatly delegated to employees and [did] not 
involve any dealing with the employer on a group basis within the meaning of Section 2(5).’” 
Crown Cork, 334 N.L.R.B. at 701 (quoting General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1232–33). The 
General Foods employees, divided into four teams, made decisions by consensus and exercised 
control over, inter alia, job assignments and rotations, interviews of job applicants and safety 
inspections. General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1233. The NLRB determined that both the 
delegation of this power to the employees and any potential withdrawal of power would be 
“wholly unilateral” on the part of the employer. Id. at 1235. The tasks assigned to the 
committees “were just other assignments of job duties . . . not normally granted to rank-and-file 
personnel.” Id. 
 In Crown Cork, the NLRB distinguished the General Foods and Crown Cork committees 
from those in Keeler Brass Co., 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995), in which an employee grievance 
committee engaged in “dealing with” the company when “the committee and the company 
‘went back and forth explaining themselves until an acceptable result was achieved’” with 
regard to an employee’s discharge. Crown Cork, 334 N.L.R.B. at 700 (quoting Keeler Brass, 
317 N.L.R.B. at 1114). The NLRB also noted that General Foods had been cited in 
Electromation for the proposition that “there is no ‘dealing’ if the organization’s ‘purpose is 
limited to performing essentially a managerial’ function.” Crown Cork, 334 N.L.R.B. at 701 
(quoting Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 (1992)). 
 159. Crown Cork, 334 N.L.R.B. at 701. 
 160. Id. The Board rejected the contention that “dealing” was present when a committee 
passed its recommendation on to a higher level of management. Id. “Rather, what is occurring 
in the Respondent’s facility is the familiar process of a managerial recommendation making its 
way up the chain of command.” Id. 
 161. Id. 
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A. Supervisory and Managerial Functions 
There is little doubt that the duties performed by the SPCO’s APC 
include some of the NLRA’s twelve enumerated supervisory 
functions.162 Most obviously, the APC’s responsibility for hiring, 
discharging, and disciplining musicians aligns squarely with the types 
of activities expressly defined by the statute as supervisory 
activities.163 In addition, the SPCO’s audition and tenure committees, 
with the complete autonomy bestowed upon them by the CBA, 
behave in a supervisory capacity when they select a new member or 
award tenure to a probationary musician.164 
The activities of the AVC, on the other hand, fall within the realm 
of managerial decision-making. As the team responsible for setting 
the “overall artistic direction and strategies of the organization,” the 
AVC clearly formulates and executes the policies of management.165 
The AVC is explicitly vested with ultimate responsibility and 
accountability for “artistic policy decisions.”166 Season programming 
and the selection of conductors and guest artists are, in a traditional 
orchestra governance structure, among the signature tasks of a music 
director. Decisions about season structure, scheduling and 
performance venues are all traditionally within the province of an 
orchestra’s artistic administration.167 The SPCO CBA takes these 
tasks out of the hands of management and places them into the hands 
of the AVC, a committee whose membership is largely composed of 
bargaining unit musicians.168 
1. In the Interest of the Employer 
The SPCO musicians have asserted that they serve on the joint 
committees in a representative capacity, and not in the interests of the 
 162. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2005); see also supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 163. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2005). 
 164. Id.; see also SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 11–13. 
 165. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 4. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See supra notes 14 and 42 and accompanying text. 
 168. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
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employer.169 However, the NLRB and courts are likely to find, as the 
Supreme Court did in Yeshiva, that, in reality, the interests of the 
musician employees cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the 
interests of the organization as a whole.170 In Yeshiva, the Court noted 
that “[t]he ‘business’ of a university is education, and its vitality 
ultimately must depend on academic policies that largely are 
formulated and generally are implemented by faculty governance 
decisions.”171 Similarly, the “business” of the SPCO is the creation of 
a quality symphonic “product.” In fact, the SPCO CBA explicitly 
states that the assignment of leadership functions to the musicians 
bears a “direct and important relationship to the artistic quality of the 
SPCO.”172 Moreover, a successful concert-going experience for 
 169. SPCO PLAYERS’ ASS’N, SPCO PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION BYLAWS art. I, § 6 (on file 
with the author). This bylaw provides: 
 Musicians who serve as representatives of their colleagues on cooperative 
committees with management shall regularly communicate with their fellow musicians 
to represent the musicians’ views responsibly and vigorously, and shall confer with the 
body of musicians in scheduled meetings with meaningful dialogue on policy issues 
and issues having a substantial impact on individual musicians or the group. It is 
understood that these musician representatives are not employers or supervisors and 
are indemnified by management (in the collective bargaining agreement) for their role 
and positions in cooperative committees with management. 
Id.  
 170. The musicians who serve on the APC and AVC committees surely see themselves as 
employees. They may view their service on these committees as either an exercise of 
independent professional judgment or service to their colleagues in a representative capacity, 
and may not see their interests as aligned with those of the management. However, it seems 
unlikely that a court or the NLRB, applying the managerial exclusion articulated in Bell 
Aerospace and developed in Yeshiva University, would view their activities the same way. The 
Yeshiva court made it clear that employees who formulated and effectuated management 
policies could exercise professional expertise and still be sufficiently aligned with management 
to qualify as managers. 444 U.S. 672, 686–88 (1980). 
 In the same way that the Yeshiva faculty controlled the university’s management policies 
by setting curriculum, matriculation and grading standards and by determining scheduling, the 
SPCO’s musicians are involved in controlling the SPCO’s management policies by setting 
programming, artistic standards, and scheduling. Id. at 676. In addition, the Yeshiva faculty was 
involved in “every case of faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion.” Id. at 
677. Similarly, the musicians on the APC are involved in every aspect of orchestra personnel 
decision-making. 
 171. Id. at 688. 
 172. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 65. But see Molly Eastman, Note, Orchestrating 
an Exclusion of Professional Workers from the NLRA: Has the Supreme Court Endangered 
Symphony Orchestra Musicians’ Collective Bargaining Rights?, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
313, 335 n.146 (2004) (asserting that orchestra musicians’ commitment to artistic quality is not 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p403 Skolnick book pages.doc  7/21/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
436 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 20:403 
 
 
 
SPCO patrons is of paramount concern to both SPCO management 
and its musicians. The same was true in Health Care, in which the 
primary concern of both the employer and the employee nurses was 
quality patient care. However, the Court determined that the nurses 
exercised supervisory authority in support of that concern.173 In the 
university, health care, and symphony orchestra contexts, the 
interests of employers and employees are clearly aligned insofar as 
they aim to offer quality education, adequate medical care, or a 
thrilling concert-going experience. When an employee exercises 
supervisory authority in support of these shared goals, he or she does 
so “in the interest of the employer,” and is therefore excluded from 
the Act’s coverage.174 
2. Independent Professional Judgment 
The musician members of the SPCO governance committees 
unquestionably exercise independent professional judgment in the 
discharge of their committee responsibilities. The all-musician 
audition and tenure committees form the front line of artistic 
judgment. Members of these committees must engage specialized 
critical faculties, honed from years of training and experience, and 
bring them to bear on decisions as to whether a candidate is worthy 
of membership in the ensemble.175 The musicians’ decisions in these 
matters are final and are not subject to review by the SPCO 
management.176 Likewise, the musicians who sit on the APC must 
base their decisions, particularly with regard to the recommendation 
of dismissals, on a similar store of professional expertise. In addition, 
the members of the AVC, though constrained by the financial 
shared by orchestra boards and managements, who are primarily interested in the orchestra’s 
role as a community service). This distinction is questionable, however, because it assumes that 
the symphonic product of an orchestra is not directly related either to the quality of the 
community service it provides or to its ability to attract funding. 
 173. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 577 (1994). 
 174. See supra notes 86, 101. 
 175. See ICSOM, Facts About Orchestra Salaries—Context, http://orchestrafacts.org/ 
context.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) (“All orchestral musicians have years of intense, 
competitive training. Nearly all have undergraduate degrees; most have graduate studies.”). 
 176. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 11–14. But see supra note 43 (asserting that the 
management retains veto power over all committee decisions). 
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parameters set by the SPCO Executive Committee, must utilize 
substantial professional expertise with regard to the selection of 
repertoire, conductors, and guest artists.177  
Far from being “ordinary professional or technical judgment” 
exercised in accordance with employer standards, which the NLRB 
argued should not qualify for the supervisory exclusion in Kentucky 
River,178 the judgment that the SPCO committees exercise is more 
akin to that exercised by the Yeshiva faculty: highly independent 
judgment that presents a real danger of divided loyalty.179 Even a 
consideration of the degree of the SPCO musicians’ discretion, a test 
approved by the Kentucky River court,180 reveals that the members’ 
discretion is not narrowly circumscribed by their employer. 
B. Employer-Dominated Labor Organization 
The SPCO governance committees clearly satisfy two of the three 
requirements of a labor organization. First, employees participate. 
Second, the subject matter the committees address includes, at a 
minimum, working conditions. The remaining question in a section 
8(a)(2) determination is whether the committees exist for the purpose, 
at least in part, of dealing with the employer.181 
1. Dealing with the Employer 
The SPCO musicians’ activities on the APC and AVC satisfy the 
Cabot Carbon standard for “dealing with” the employer, which 
embraces a broader range of activities than simply collective 
bargaining.182 The discussions that take place between the musician 
and management members, while not collective bargaining per se, 
satisfy the NLRB’s less stringent requirement of a bilateral 
 177. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 4. 
 178. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 714 (2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 179. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 689 (1980) (noting the problem of divided 
loyalty as “particularly acute”). 
 180. Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 713. 
 181. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 182. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 211 (1959). 
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mechanism, outlined by the Seventh Circuit in Electromation.183 
Simply because each committee acts only on decisions made by 
consensus or by a supermajority of four members, every action 
proposed by the musician members must receive “real or apparent 
consideration” by management.184 Further, the consensus or 
supermajority requirement means that any action taken by the 
committee must necessarily receive the approval of at least one of the 
management members.185 This presents the same situation that was at 
issue in du Pont, in which the managers’ capacity to reject employee 
proposals from within the committees was declared “only a 
difference of form” from dealing that may have taken place between 
employees and management outside the committees.186 
2. Employer Domination 
Although the employer did not dominate the formation of the 
SPCO joint committees, as the structure was bargained for and 
agreed upon during collective bargaining negotiations,187 there are 
serious questions about whether the employer dominates the 
committees’ administration. Most obviously, musician members are 
effectively compensated for their service on the committees.188 
Financial and logistical support for committee meetings were among 
the factors the NLRB took into account in finding a section 8(a)(2) 
violation in Electromation.189 
The employer dominates the activities of the SPCO committees in 
two other ways as well. First, as discussed above, the consensus or 
supermajority decision-making requirement means that no proposal 
from the musicians will get beyond the committee without the 
 183. Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1161 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 184. Id. 
 185. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 186. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895 (1993). 
 187. Since the negotiations were conducted utilizing the same kind of consensus-based 
decision-making used by the committees, questions remain as to whether management did, in 
fact, impermissibly dominate the formation of the committees. This issue is beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
 188. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 189. Electromation, 35 F.3d at 1170 (noting that while employer support alone was not an 
unfair labor practice, “in the totality of the circumstances in this case such support may 
reasonably be characterized to be in furtherance of the company’s domination”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol20/iss1/13
p403 Skolnick book pages.doc  7/21/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  Control, Collaboration or Coverage 439 
 
 
 
agreement of at least one management member.190 In Electromation 
and du Pont, the Seventh Circuit and the NLRB found this kind of 
management veto power indicative of improper domination.191 While 
this requirement could result in decision-making gridlock, the more 
likely outcome is that the musicians will temper their proposals—in 
effect self-censoring their views—to present proposals most likely to 
pass the scrutiny of the management members. 
Management also dominates the SPCO committees in the method 
by which musician members of the committee are selected. Only one 
musician on each committee, having been elected by his or her 
colleagues, can claim to act in a truly representative capacity.192 
Another musician on each committee serves merely because he or she 
volunteered for service; this member may not be the person their 
colleagues would have chosen had they voted.193 The third musician’s 
position on each committee is the most suspect. Neither elected by 
peers nor volunteering, this musician is hand-selected by the existing 
members of the committee, including the two management members; 
his or her appointment is subject to the same consensus or 
supermajority decision-making requirement as all other committee 
decisions.194 Management control over the selection of committee 
members was an important factor in finding a section 8(a)(2) 
violation in both the Electromation and du Pont cases.195 In this 
situation, musician proposals may be tempered to win the approval of 
management committee members. Moreover, suggestions for future 
committee members are highly unlikely to include those musicians 
whose views are openly contrary to those views of management, no 
 190. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 191. Electromation, 35 F.3d at 1163 (noting that management committee members were 
permitted to “review and reject committee proposals before they could be presented to upper 
level management”); E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 896 (noting that employer veto power 
“exists by virtue of the management members’ participation in consensus decision-making”). 
 192. SPCO Agreement, supra note 1, at 4, 6. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Electromation, 35 F.3d at 1170 (finding that employer exercised “significant control 
over the employees’ participation and voice at the committee meetings”); E.I. du Pont, 311 
N.L.R.B. at 896 (finding that employer determined how many employees served and decided 
between volunteers where their number exceeded the available positions). 
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matter how representative they may be of the majority of orchestra 
members.196 
C. Committee Performance of Managerial or Supervisory Functions 
As the above analysis indicates, the SPCO committees potentially 
violate section 8(a)(2), and should, therefore, be subject to 
disestablishment. However, the NLRB can make an exception for 
committees whose duties are actually managerial and supervisory. As 
in Crown Cork, the SPCO scheme effectively delegates functions 
traditionally carried out by management personnel to joint employer-
employee committees.197 Similar to the hierarchical structure 
implemented in Crown Cork, the SPCO committees operate within 
specific levels, or spheres, of authority.198 For example, the audition 
and tenure committees serve with a degree of autonomy in 
specialized roles that are overseen by the APC. Above these 
committees sits the management. All committee decisions are, 
according to SPCO manager, Bruce Coppock, subject to veto by 
management.199 In addition, the SPCO’s Board of Directors retains 
ultimate fiscal responsibility.200 Although each level is answerable to 
the one above, each committees is, at its respective level, empowered 
to “decide and do” with regard to a range of issues comparable to 
those controlled by the Crown Cork committees.201 Management’s 
power to veto decisions and the Board of Directors’ ultimate control 
over the institution do not constitute “dealing with” the musicians; 
rather, as in Crown Cork, these employer controls are consistent with 
the ordinary managerial structure of any company.202 
 196. Management’s selection of its own representatives is in no way constrained, and in 
practice, the SPCO management has placed two of its most powerful managers, the CEO and 
the General Manager, on both committees. E-mail from Herb Winslow, Orchestra Committee 
Chair, SPCO, to Rochelle Gnagey Skolnick (Oct. 31, 2004) (on file with author). 
 197. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699, 699 (2001). 
 198. Id. at 701 (“[W]ithin their delegated spheres of authority, the seven committees are 
management.”). 
 199. E-mail from Herb Winslow, supra note 196. 
 200. See supra notes 14 and 42 and accompanying text. 
 201. Crown Cork, 334 N.L.R.B. at 704. 
 202. Id. at 701. 
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CONCLUSION 
Orchestra musicians are clearly faced with a conundrum. The 
American market for live classical music presents numerous hurdles 
to institutional success. Orchestras, including the SPCO, have 
responded by trying to reinvent themselves, both in terms of their 
public appeal and their institutional structures.203 The waning 
presence of music directors has left gaps in organizations whose 
CBAs assume the presence of a dominating artistic guide to carry out 
certain essential leadership functions. Musicians, drawn in by the 
leadership vacuum and eager to make the best possible use of their 
talents and skills, have begun to expand their traditional roles. 
Unfortunately, American labor law has not kept pace with 
changes in the American workplace. Explorations in collaborative 
governance are not new to American industry, but the law does not 
provide for such models. As a result, these ventures present the 
danger to employers that the joint committees may violate section 
8(a)(2), and the danger to employees that their service on these 
committees may confer on them supervisory or managerial status, 
placing them outside the coverage of the NLRA. 
Musicians have long been cognizant of risks to their employee 
status because of their roles as principal players or their service on 
audition committees.204 The industry’s new move toward shared 
governance jeopardizes that status via an alternate route. Scholars are 
sanguine about negotiating CBAs that leave workers exposed to the 
danger of being cast outside the coverage of the Act.205 Musicians 
should be cognizant of these dangers and refuse to accept agreements 
that threaten their covered employee status. While the level of trust 
 203. See, e.g., Daniel J. Wakin, New Overtures at the Symphony, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
2005, at Arts and Leisure 1. Wakin describes the “wide array of methods” American orchestras 
currently employ to build and diversify their audiences. Id. 
 204. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 172; Leonard Leibowitz, Yeshiva Revisited, SENZA 
SORDINO, Dec. 2002, at 11, available at http://www.icsom.org/pdf/senza405.pdf. 
 205. Interview with Thomas Kochan, Co-Director, Inst. for Work and Employment 
Research, Mass. Inst. of Tech., Sloan School of Mgmt., and Professor of Mgmt. and Eng’g Sys. 
(Nov. 18, 2004). Kochan acknowledged this danger, particularly if an employer, who adopted 
such a shared governance structure, chose to refuse to bargain with its employees in the future. 
Id. However, he asserted that if there was a high level of trust between the parties, they should 
not be afraid to “get out in front of the law.” Id. 
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between musicians and management of a given institution may today 
be high, given the historically rapid turnover rate of managements 
and boards, there is no guarantee for musicians that tomorrow’s 
leadership will be similarly benign. If a future SPCO management 
refuses to bargain with the musicians, claiming it has no duty to do so 
because the musicians are not statutorily covered employees, the 
musicians would be unlikely to convince the NLRB otherwise. 
Musicians should not and need not, however, entirely remove 
themselves from the governance of their institutions. As the resident 
body of experts on the artistic product of the symphony orchestra, 
musicians represent a vast resource for orchestra CEOs and boards of 
directors. Service on traditional audition committees and artistic 
advisory committees, as long as it is undertaken in a purely advisory 
capacity, should present no substantial dangers to the status of 
musicians under the NLRA. Cooperative committees, for which the 
parties bargain, that do not vest the musicians with supervisory or 
managerial tasks or impinge on the union’s role as the exclusive 
bargaining representative can discuss topics of mutual concern to 
management and musicians.206 Certainly, management should 
cultivate concerted efforts by musicians to educate board members on 
certain issues. These activities can all be undertaken with minimal 
risk to either side, and have the potential to pay great dividends in 
terms of the symphony orchestra’s continued vitality. 
Unless and until Congress enacts substantial labor reforms, 
musicians and managements must tread carefully to remain on the 
correct side of the NLRA. Gains secured for orchestra musicians 
through collective bargaining must be safeguarded and cultivated 
watchfully to ensure the vibrant future of American orchestral music. 
 206. See Moberly, supra note 116, at 359 (concluding that section 8(a)(2) does not 
preclude the development of cooperative programs so long as they do not involve employers 
dealing with employees on conditions of employment). 
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